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ABSTRACT 
 
Modern secularism, as theorized by prominent liberal philosophers such as John Rawls and 
Jürgen Habermas, prescribes that the state should treat all religions equally on condition that they 
and their adherents relinquish their theocratic aspirations and recognize the political sovereignty 
and superiority of man-made law. Convinced that the secular bargain undermines the moral 
virtue of society and its members, a small, fragmented, but nevertheless conspicuous number of 
Islamists in Europe prefers to observe Islamic law in all walks of life, private and public. 
Alarmed by Islamists and informed by Orientalist readings of Islam, an increasingly vehement 
and vociferous contingent of Islamophobes avers that Islam is inherently incompatible with 
democracy and urges European governments to treat neither Islam nor Muslims equally, but 
rather suspiciously as real or potential threats to the wellbeing of European societies. In contrast, 
advocates of Euro-Islam insist that Islam can be reformed, like Christianity, to meet the 
requirements of modern secularism. This paper contends that elements of all three of these vying 
positions have found their way into policymaking targeting Muslims in several European lands. 
The resulting inconsistency and contradiction – what I call policy “messiness” – corroborate the 
process of “mutual fragilization” theorized by Charles Taylor in which actors facing radical 
value pluralism develop solicitude regarding their own principles as well as greater tolerance for 
ambivalence. The latter, in particular, creates what Homi Bhabha terms a “third space” from 
which actors confronting cultural pluralism can freely and constructively explore cross-
fertilizations and hybrid combinations with the potential to yield yet unimagined approaches and 
solutions to the problems of “super-diversity.” Just such creative hybridity does the paper 
identify among a younger generation of European Muslims whom many observers dub “Post-
Islamists.” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Intensified efforts since 9/11 to incorporate Muslims and Islam into the European secular order 
have generated considerable resistance and controversy. Though church-state relations 
institutionally vary from one European land to the next, they supposedly converge normatively 
around a liberal understanding of secularism.1 Liberal secularism prescribes that believers 
depoliticize their religious convictions in exchange for equal treatment before the law. 
Depoliticization does not have to mean that religious persons and beliefs disappear from politics 
altogether. After all, Christian political parties, pressure groups, politicians and activists abound 
in Europe. However, liberal secularism does demand that religions and their adherents jettison 
theocratic aspirations and recognize the political sovereignty and superiority of secular (that is, 
man-made, ideally democratic) law and government that treat all faiths and all citizens equally.2 
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This minimal requirement is what Rawls means by an “overlapping consensus” despite “the fact 
of a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines -- the fact of reasonable 
pluralism.”3 Habermas similarly theorizes “a consensus on the process of legitimate legislation 
and exercise of power” by a “citizenry [that] can no longer be bound together by a substantive 
consensus of values.”4 A small, fragmented, but nevertheless conspicuous number of Islamists in 
Europe reject this requirement, though not always for the same reasons or in the same manner.5 
Contending that Western secularism has shown itself to be spiritually vapid and ruinous, they 
prefer to observe Islamic law in all walks of life, private and public. At the same time, an 
increasingly vehement and vociferous contingent of Islamophobes avers that Islam is inherently 
incompatible with liberal secular democracy and urges European governments to treat neither 
Islam nor Muslims equally, but rather suspiciously as real or potential threats to the wellbeing of 
European societies.6 Expressed differently, while liberalism in theory aspires to eliminate 
prejudice, Islamism endorses prejudice in favor of Islam, Islamophobia prejudice against Islam. 
Long considered politically taboo in post-Holocaust Europe, prejudice based on (anti-)religious 
conviction is back in vogue, spawning, as a result, intensified value pluralism regarding the 
proper place of religion in politics.7 
 Religious and ideological diversity can and does produce discord, but it can also occasion 
“mutual fragilization.” This is the term Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age, invents to describe 
“certainly one of the main features of the world of 2000, in contrast to that of 1500.”8 The 
Canadian philosopher has in mind a widespread softening of individual convictions in the face of 
heightened awareness of opposing views. 
We live in a condition where we cannot help but be aware that there are a number 
of different construals, views which intelligent, reasonably undeluded people, of 
good will, can and do disagree on. We cannot help looking over our shoulder 
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from time to time, looking sideways, living our faith also in condition and 
uncertainty.9 
 
In an atmosphere of radical moral pluralism -- what Bauman has termed a “heterophilic age,”10 
Beck, Giddens and Lash “reflexive modernization”11 -- humans become bombarded with 
clashing normative outlooks. As Young cleverly puts it, “the deviant other is everywhere” but 
“everyone is a potential deviant.”12 Although exposure to radical moral pluralism leads some to 
harden their views, most “fragilize,” that is, they develop conscious or unconscious solicitude 
regarding the moral stances they prefer. While fragilization can be unsettling and bewildering, it 
can also create what Taylor calls a “neutral zone,”13 Homi Bhabha a “third space,”14 from which 
actors confronting cultural pluralism can freely and constructively explore cross-fertilizations 
and hybrid combinations with the potential to yield yet unimagined approaches and solutions to 
the problems of “super-diversity.”15 
This paper seeks to document mutual fragilization at the level of ideology and policy. As 
regards the first, I draw attention to political actors who borrow and combine ideas from 
normative worldviews that, from a purely and purist philosophical perspective, collide and 
exclude one another. As regards the latter, I point to policy “messiness,” the tendency to tolerate 
and enact policies whose intents and consequences run at cross purposes.16 Both types of 
fragilization manifest new patterns of European secularism -- actually secularisms – in which the 
prospect of and perhaps even the need for an “overlapping consensus” are abating. 
One preliminary caveat is in order. I do not for a moment want to imply that normative 
pluralism alone shapes policymaking. Analysts have identified a range of non-normative factors 
that influence immigration policy. These include demographics,17 health of the economy,18 
political opportunity structures,19 international crises,20 media salience,21 level of government,22 
courts,23 institutional and legal heritage,24 political access25, asymmetry of available resources,26 
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ethnic origin,27 type of political actor such as (opportunistic, ideological) elected officials versus 
(pragmatic, problem-solving) administrators,28 and administrative rationality or 
“governmentality.”29 That noted, several studies document the considerable influence of 
normative arguments and expectations on immigration policy making.30 These and other studies 
of normative frames and schemas have tended to exaggerate the degree and extent of normative 
consensus in any given land, making the French out to be, for instance, uniformly republicans, 
the Germans ethno-nationalists, the British and Dutch multiculturalists.31 By contrast, the 
concept of fragilization enables us to unpack the normative dimension in such a way as to reveal 
its polyvalent, dynamic, that is, messy character.  
EURO-ISLAM 
Most European governments have since 9/11 adopted a two-pronged approach to homeland 
security: 1) increase police efforts and powers to detect, thwart, arrest and convict terrorists and 
their enablers; and 2) more vigorously encourage the integration of Muslims into society so as to 
lessen their sense of alienation and presumed susceptibility to political extremism. The latter has 
entailed the pledge to combat the rampant Islamophobic discrimination that countless studies 
have documented in most European lands.32 Prodded by the European Union’s Race Directive of 
2000, whose Article Seven denounces discrimination based on religion, member states have 
established anti-discrimination agencies such as the Commission for Equality and Human Rights 
in the United Kingdom (2004), the Haute Authorité de Lutte contre la Discriminations et pour 
l’Egalité in France (2005; since 2011 Défenseur des Droits) and Die Antidiskriminierungsstelle 
des Bundes in Germany (2006). Going a step farther, most European governments have sought to 
counterbalance inherited institutional favoritism by establishing formal, high-profile relations 
with Islam that aim to parallel and (eventually) emulate those already in place between the state 
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and Christianity (and often Judaism). While some states, such as Austria, Belgium, Sweden and 
the Netherlands, already had close ties with Islamic representatives long before 9/11, others 
deliberately moved to form them thereafter. Thus did France found the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman in 2003, Britain the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board in 2005, and 
Germany the Deutsche Islam Konferenz in 2006. The following official mission statement of the 
Italian Consulta Islamica, set up in 2005, is typical. It is to be  
a consultative body of the Interior Ministry that conducts research which 
formulates positions and proposals for the purpose of encouraging institutional 
dialogue with the Islamic communities in order to identify the most adequate 
solutions for a harmonious inclusion of Islam within the national community with 
respect to the laws of the Italian Republic.33 
 
 These and other efforts to embrace Muslims have been endorsed at the highest levels of 
government. As early as 1993, French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua posited: “It is no longer 
enough to talk of Islam in France. There has to be a French Islam. The French Republic is ready 
for this.”34 In 2009 in an editorial in Le Monde (9 December), French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
voiced his desire to “put the Muslim religion on an equal footing with all other great religions.” 
German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has also maintained that his society and 
government must endeavor to transform the “Muslims in Germany” into “German Muslims.”35 
Tony Blair first visited a mosque at the outset of Ramadan in 1999, Her Majesty ordered a prayer 
room built at Windsor Castle for her lone Muslim servant in 2004, and Prince Charles has voiced 
his wish to be crowned “Defender of Faiths” rather than “Defender of the Faith.” 
 The desired end of such out-reach is “Euro-Islam,” a neologism as telling as it is popular. 
It is telling because Euro-Islam is not only conceived as an Islam befitting life in Europe, but 
also as a Europeanized Islam, that is, an Islam that has been subjected to similar self-scrutiny and 
self-reform as the Christian denominations are alleged to have undergone in the modern age 
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(even if with formidable resistance at times, such as within Roman Catholicism prior to Vatican 
II).36 As envisaged by its proponents, reformists such as Naser Khader (Denmark), Baroness 
Kishwer Falkner (UK), Malek Cheleb (France) and Bassam Tibi (Germany), Euro-Islam would 
relinquish its theocratic ambitions and embrace democracy. It would tolerate all other faiths, 
including atheism, and recognize the right of each individual to choose or craft his or her own 
creed. Freedom of religion further means that the prohibition of apostasy would have to be 
excised from Islamic doctrine. Furthermore, Euro-Islam would purge from conventional Islam 
all precepts and rituals which offend modern democratic sensibilities, such as the subordination 
of women to men or eye-for-eye justice. Likewise, this “enlightened Islam [which] is compatible 
with world civilization, with Europe, and with the spirit of the Republic”37 would systematically 
disavow Quranic interpretations of nature belied by modern science. Most importantly, it would 
entail subjecting the Quran to the same kind of rational scrutiny applied in biblical criticism 
since the nineteenth century. The sacred text would be read not as the inerrant and literal word of 
God but as the words of specific men formulated in specific times – indeed times very different 
from our own. French reformer Bassam Tahhan writes: “The tradition regards the Koran as one-
dimensional and fixed. This approach is not rationalist. To be a rationalist is to accept that each 
era, with its [particular] methods and discoveries, presents its own reading of the Koran, and this 
is the way it will be until the end of days.”38 Once Muslims are made to understand that there 
exists no real alternative to interpreting the Quran, they will become more comfortable 
customizing the creed to better jibe with modern rationalism, including democracy and 
pluralism. An Islam based on independent judgment (ijtihad) rather than on slavish obedience to 
authority is not only compatible with the Quran but likelier to survive and thrive in a culture such 
as Europe’s that celebrates free choice.39 Euro-Islam represents, then, a largely depoliticized 
7 
 
Islam which seeks to reinforce and accommodate rather than question or disrupt the perceived 
European secular order. The acknowledged Habermasian and Euro-Muslim Bassam Tibi 
summarizes: 
By acknowledging cultural and religious pluralism, Euro-Islam would give up the 
claim of Islamic dominance. Thus defined, Euro-Islam would be compatible with 
liberal democracy, individual human rights, and the requirements of a civil 
society. It would also contrast sharply with the communitarian politics that result 
in ghettoization. To be sure, the politics of Euro-Islam would not allow complete 
assimilation of Muslims. Yet it could enable the adoption of forms of civil society 
leading to an enlightened, open-minded Islamic identity compatible with 
European civic culture.40 
 
Mainstream European politicians officially pronounce that they will have no truck with 
any Islam except Euro-Islam. Indeed, they often opportunistically exploit relations with Islam to 
spotlight their unequivocally democratic credentials. For instance, a then still Interior Minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy said of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003: “It is precisely 
because we recognize the right of Islam to sit at the table of the republic that we will not accept 
any deviation. Any prayer leader whose views run contrary to the values of the republic will be 
expelled.”41 Tony Blair, while averring that the only sure strategy for defeating Islamist 
extremism had to embrace Islam, nonetheless emphatically added: “There has to be a shared 
acceptance that some things we believe in and we do together: obedience to certain values like 
democracy, rule of law, equality between men and women...This common space cannot be left to 
chance or individual decsion. It has to be accepted as mandatory.”42 And in a unmistakable 
allusion to Muslims, Angela Merkel insisted that “anyone coming here must respect our 
constitution and tolerate our Western and Christian roots.”43 Indeed, at one meeting of the 
German Islam Conference, the Muslim participants were asked to strike from their Qurans verses 
at odds with gender equality as a show of sincere commitment to democracy.44  
 ISLAMOPHOBIA 
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Such hardline stances manifest fragilization toward Islamophobic prejudice. They hold Islam in 
greater suspicion and therefore to a higher standard than Christianity or Judaism. It is hard to 
imagine, for instance, a European politician (save perhaps a Communist) seeking to score 
popularity points by demanding that Christian clerics strike passages from their Holy Scripture. 
Invitees to such state-sponsored “dialogues” often include, in addition to imams, Muslim 
apostates and even atheists who have in one way or another made a name for themselves telling 
of the oppression they suffered as “Muslims,” that is as “insider experts” of a sort.45 As some 
indignant Muslim clerics who took part in the first German Islam Conference in 2006 
sardonically complained regarding the invitees, the rough counterpart would be inviting “the 
Pope and pop star Madonna” to a purportedly serious meeting regarding relations between the 
state and the Roman Catholic Church.46 Indeed, it has been practicing as opposed to lapsed 
Muslims who have frequently been expelled from such commissions (typically on suspicion of 
ties to the Muslim Brotherhood).47 The (Bernard) Stasi Commission convened by Jacques Chirac 
in 2003, which recommended the ban on veils in French schools that passed into law in 2004, 
excluded testimony from veiled women on grounds that their views could not be trusted as their 
own.48 Bans of various kinds on Islamic dress (not to mention mosques and minarets) exist or are 
being considered in many other European lands.49 Equally prejudiced against or suspicious of 
Islam in particular are the numerous integration and civics courses and loyalty pledges that for 
all intents and purposes only Muslims are required to take in order to obtain citizenship or a visa. 
The Dutch course introduced in 1998, which has served as something of a model for the various 
types of loyalty tests that have subsequently sprung up in many European lands, subjects 
“students” to footage of gay men kissing and topless women sunbathing to teach and test the 
appropriate response, which, needless to say, is toleration rather than indignation.50 Nor should 
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we overlook the fact that racial and ethnic profiling of Muslims by police has proliferated across 
Europe as have deport-first-prove-later measures for dealing with suspected criminals of Muslim 
heritage.51 Sadly, the preoccupation with Muslims may have contributed to the free reign 
exploited by “Christian” terrorists such as Norway’s Anders Behring Breivik or Germany’s 
National Socialist Underground Zwickau Cell. 
 The extra scrutiny is necessary, claim Islamophobes, because Islam is inherently 
antidemocratic and expansionist. European Islamophobia tends to manifest itself in two often 
overlapping, but nonetheless distinguishable strands. Mostly from the progressive Left stem 
concerns that the large presence of Muslims imperils the slow but steady progress of Reason and 
Democracy in Europe since the Enlightenment against the benighted forces of obscurantism and 
tyranny. The Quran preaches theocracy – “the dictatorship of the mullahs”52 – and commands of 
its followers “submission” to divine law (Sharia) rather than self-determination through 
democracy. Particularly threatened are the most recent achievements of the ongoing 
Enlightenment project such as equal rights for women and for homosexuals. The former Islam 
treats as virtual slaves whose place in heaven can be secured only through obsequious obedience 
to men; the latter as base sinners whose destiny is eternal damnation. Typical of this common 
essentializing trope is Thierry Chervel’s lament, versions of which could be quoted from any 
number of a chorus of prominent Islam-naysayers such as André Glucksmann, Emmanuell Todd, 
Fadela Amara, Herman Philipse, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek,  Ralph Giordano, and Farrukh 
Dhondy: 
In the confrontation with Islamism, the Left has abandoned its principles. In the 
past it stood for cutting the ties to convention and tradition, but in the case of 
Islam it reinstates them in the name of multiculturalism. It is proud to have fought 
for women's rights, but in Islam it tolerates head scarves, arranged marriages, and 
wife-beating. It once stood for equal rights, now it preaches a right to difference – 
and thus different rights. It proclaims freedom of speech, but when it comes to 
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Islam it coughs in embarrassment. It once supported gay rights, but now keeps 
silent about Islam's taboo on homosexuality. The West's long-due process of self-
relativisation at the end of the colonial era, which was promoted by postmodernist 
and structuralist ideas, has led to cultural relativism and the loss of standards.53 
 
So convinced of Islam’s inherent inclination toward dictatorship is prominent French intellectual 
Bernhard Henri Lévy that he refuses to refer to Islamists with anything but the neologism 
“fascislamist.” Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer prefers “the new 
totalitarianism.”54 It seems an obvious conclusion that “one cannot consider Islam a religion 
among others, a religion that might have a right to exist under the big roof of European 
tolerance.”55 
From the right side of the political spectrum one more often encounters grave concern 
regarding the purported adulteration of Europe’s “Judeo-Christian character.” Large-scale 
postwar immigration combined with higher birth rates among Muslims is said to have 
occasioned the “Islamization” of Europe to a point where natives feel “strangers in their own 
country.”56 While soberer observers raise doubts about dilution of the ethnic and linguistic 
homogeneity or “social glue” that any society supposedly requires to function well,57 other more 
alarmist and vociferous Cassandras discern an Islamic conspiracy to transform Europe into 
“Eurabia” using Muslim migrants as the foot soldiers. Thus wrote Italian journalist Oriana 
Fallaci in her second bestselling diatribe against Islam, The Force of Reason: “Europe becomes 
more and more a province of Islam, a colony of Islam. In each of our cities lies a second city: a 
Muslim city, a city run by the Koran. A stage in the Islamic expansionism.”58 Indeed purporting 
to expose such a plot has become one of the surest ways since 9/11 to catapult oneself onto the 
bestseller list.59 Like Fallaci’s, the paranoid arguments typically contend that Islam harbors a 
built-in urge toward militant expansionism which stems back to its very founder, Muhammad, 
who established an Islamic theocracy in Mecca with the sword. Following the prophet’s lead, 
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subsequent Islamic Empires have all deployed military might to spread the faith, including into 
Europe during the Middle Ages. Islamists and Jihadists will not stop until they have conquered 
Europe as their stepping stone to subduing the entire West. Tolerating their presence represents 
Europe’s 21st-century counterpart to Munich of 1938.60  
Both left and right Islamophobia draw from and reinforce (neo)Orientalist discourse. 
Said, of course, penned the classic study of Orientalism as a discourse that not only stigmatized 
the Orient but also legitimized its domination by Western powers. The discourse, created and 
conveyed by an interlocking network of artists, experts, administrators, journalists and 
politicians, represents Islam as a monolithic and static religion, culture, indeed, entire civilization 
that resists not only change but, in particular, rational persuasion. The discourse is furthermore 
reductionist and essentialist in that it portrays all Muslims as fully determined by an all-
encompassing Islamic ethos. The discourse thereby denies Muslims the free agency and reason 
to adapt, alter or reject their faith. This supposition, moreover, conveniently dismisses Muslims’ 
self-representation as the nonsensical utterances of persons intellectually imprisoned by a 
benighted creed and culture. In the Orientalist discourse, Muslims are represented rather than 
heard, suspected rather than trusted and governed rather than empowered. Finally, by creating 
the proverbial Negative Other, the discourse self-servingly projects a positive counter-image of 
the West and Westerners as utterly other and therefore superior to unenlightened Orientals. “The 
Orient,” writes Said, “has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, 
personality, experience…European culture gained its strength and identity by setting itself off 
against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.”61 
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There now exists a plethora of studies documenting both the prevalence and sway of this 
type of neo-Orientalist discourse in European politics and media.62 Gest’s assessment is 
representative: 
Interpretations of Islam that portray it as irreducible, impenetrable, 
undifferentiated and immune to processes of change have long obscured the 
complexities of the historical experience of Muslims across different societies. 
Today, these perceptions persist, overlooking the complicated process of 
acculturation and mutual adaptation by Muslims and institutions of Western 
Europe. They ignore Islam’s plasticity and diversity, and instead allow 
exaggerated misimages – stemming from exotica or invented in a narrow 
historical context and augmented by selective episodic details – to constitute 
Muslim history and tradition. And by considering Islam as an undifferentiated 
whole, essentialist discourse is able to broad-brush Muslims as a threat to the 
equally undifferentiated “good” societies of the West.63 
 
The power of Islamophobia lies in transforming prejudice into prudence. The “Muslims” that 
vast numbers of non-Muslim Europeans “know” are for the most part virtual or fully 
“mediatized;”64 and these fictionalized Muslims are indeed sinister and threatening, for their 
imputed Islamic piety makes them immutably anti-democratic, regressive, misogynistic, 
militaristic, and, most worrisomely, irrational. Small wonder, then, that the 2011 Pew Global 
Attitudes Survey found that 36% of those polled in Britain and France, 55% in Germany, and 
63% in Spain have an “unfavorable” attitude toward Muslims in general.65 European Muslims 
have become the victim (before but even more so after 9/11) of what Stanley Cohen has 
diagnosed as “moral panic.” Moral panic obtains when opportunistic political agents manage to 
stigmatize a targeted group in such a way that the group’s purported moral deviance becomes 
convincingly portrayed as an existential threat to the society as a whole.66 Furthermore, moral 
panic is all the likelier in the “risk society” of late modernity where persons become preoccupied 
more with potential than with actual dangers.67 
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Moral panic feeds off exaggeration as much as distortion. Needless to say, neither 
European secularism nor Christianity lies imperiled, at least not from Muslims. Theocratic 
parties and politicians remain rare and largely unelectable. The schools, both private and public, 
overwhelmingly teach and socialize pupils to the core secularist tenet that democratic law is 
supreme. Indeed, studies reveal that the vast majority of European Muslims are assimilating to 
secular lifestyles that fore the most part relegate religious belief and practice to the private 
sphere.68 At the same time, European lands remain fully saturated in Christian lore, ritual, and 
symbolism, from hourly ringing church bells to crucifixes in classrooms to religious oriented 
holidays, all of which Muslims must suffer. The (Gregorian) calendar itself is of Christian origin! 
Laborde labels such favoritism “soft rules,” mostly unorchestrated, unofficial yet pervasive 
favoring of Christian norms, expectations and presuppositions as “normal” and Muslim ones as 
“abnormal.”69 And yet, much Christian favoritism is officially and deliberately state-sponsored. 
Take the case of private but nonetheless state-subsidized religious schools. Germany has 
thousands of Christian schools compared to two Islamic schools; the Netherlands 5000 compared 
to 50; Britain 7000 compared to seven (despite the fact that more Muslims, in absolute not 
proportional terms, weekly attend mosque than Anglicans weekly attend church).70 Even in 
laïque France, roughly a fifth of French pupils attend religious (mostly Christian) schools 85 
percent of whose costs are covered by the state.71 By contrast, only a few dozen Muslim pupils 
attend a handful of Muslim schools.72 As Davie incisively observes, “in European society, the 
religious playing field is not level, nor is it likely to become so in the foreseeable future.”73 Not a 
single European land currently comes close to fulfilling Bauböck’s elegant vision of genuine 
secular neutrality and fairness: 
the state can live up to its obligation of equal concern and respect for all citizens 
by, on the one hand, extending whatever historical privileges the dominant 
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religion has enjoyed to the minority congregations and, on the other hand, 
abolishing those that involuntarily subject non-believers to some religious 
authority.74 
 
ISLAMISM & EUROPOBIA 
Both secular and Christian favoritism enrage and terrify Islamists. For them the issue is not 
simply maintaining a particular identity; it is about defending their access to eternal salvation. 
They resolutely believe that Christian (and Jewish) denominations have made a tragic, even 
suicidal mistake with grave consequences for all humanity in submitting to the conditions of 
Western secularism. By subordinating themselves to man-made law, they have forfeited the role 
of moral leadership, thereby opened the way for unbuttoned hedonism to become the ersatz 
religion for the masses, and left morally unguided and unchecked an economic and political elite 
that has ravaged the globe and its peoples through wanton pursuit of this-worldly profit and 
power. Secularism, for Islamists, is synonymous with the triumph of sin over morality, evil over 
good. They resolve to resist it, which they believe they do best by endeavoring to live by Islamic 
precepts as much as possible in all aspects of their life. One Copenhagen imam, for example, 
averred in 2004 that “secularism is a disgusting form of oppression…No Muslim can accept 
secularism, freedom, and democracy. It is for Allah alone to legislate how our society shall be 
regulated. Muslims wish and long for Allah’s law to replace the law of man.”75 A zealous 
cybernaut at oumma.com, likewise, announces: “Laws made by men are made for them and 
therefore are always unjust, only Quranic law is good because it is impartial.”76 Such words echo 
Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, a widely read and praised book among Islamists in which the 
venerated martyr denounces all man-made laws as the product of ignorance (jahilyya) and calls 
on his brethren to defy, depose and replace them with Islamic law wherever possible.77  The 
organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, claims that “Islam is a complete way of life that 
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provides guidance for man in all aspects of life. It is not defined in contradistinction to other 
ideologies or religions, but by being the truth revealed by the creator of man, life and the 
universe.”78 This is what I mean by the term “Islamism,” which I use broadly to envelop the 
beliefs of all those who strive toward a society in which Islamic precepts and laws -- typically 
understood as those enunciated in the Quran and Sunnah – predominate. Due to limited space, I 
gloss over the significant differences in strategy for achieving the Islamist goal -- differences 
ranging from pietist personal conversion stressed by such groups as Tablighi Jamaat and 
Jamaatunnur, to non-violent political action practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
European affiliate the Union of Islamic Organizations in Europe, to violent jihadi militant 
organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Supporters of Shariah and Groupe Islamique Armé.79 
Islamists tend to engage in inverted othering. The concept parallels what others identify 
as a “duplication” or “mirror” effect whereby radicalized Muslims recast the stigma of 
themselves as Europe’s negative Other to produce an equally reductionist counter-stereotype in 
which the West and Westerners appear evil and Islam and “true” Muslims good.80 Inverted 
othering too reveals fragilization. Islamist activists shrewdly borrow from postcolonial and 
postmodern studies influential readings of the West in late modernity and customize them to 
undergird their Islamist agenda. The conventional image of Islamists as proverbial ostriches with 
their heads sunk deep in the sand of a medieval worldview misses the mark. I concur with Roy, 
who contends that Islamist activists are best understood as fully integrated into a single global 
political discourse whose successful ideas and tactics they keenly study and dexterously 
employ.81 
Islamists, for instance, deftly exploit the postmodern argument that Muslims are Europe’s 
latest Other, the newest group Europeans love to hate. As intimated above, this postmodern 
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argument that interprets Muslims as something like the new Jews, whose stigmatized popular 
image reinforces European superciliousness, has become a staple of European migration studies, 
particularly on the Left.82 Like postmodernists, Islamists contend that the stigmatization of 
Muslims is not merely hypocritical, a double standard, but rather constitutive of European 
identity itself. Postmodernists, of course, offer up a wide variety of reasons, ranging from 
sublimated impulses and needs à la Freud to simple force of habit, for why Westerners engage in 
negative othering. Islamists, by contrast, contend that Westerners stigmatize Muslims because 
they have nothing to be proud of in their own civilization, having completely befouled it through 
rampant turpitude. Rotterdam-based imam, Khalil el-Moumni, for example, declares that 
“Western civilization is a civilization without morals,” while the Islamic Party of Britain 
contends that “there is nothing in Western societies that remotely resembles good behaviour.”83 
According to the Muslim Parliament UK, Europe is “beginning to develop disorders of the mind, 
body and soul as a direct consequence of unmitigated secularism.”84 Thankfully, claims Kalim 
Siddiqui, Islam “possesses moral precepts such as collective responsibility and moderation that 
liberate man from western-like materialism, egoism and money-grabbing corruption and 
overriding selfish individualism of the West.”85 Westerners do not want to face this disturbing 
fact. The Swedish journal Salaam charges: “The ones who are behind this negative propaganda 
hate the message that Islam has brought, i.e. that all men are equal before Allah and that the best 
of us is the most devout.” They aim to “make Islam look like a weird, horrible and strange faith 
so that no one ever should come to think of taking an interest in or convert to that faith.”86 
A second trope commonly employed by Islamists contends that Europe and Europeans 
have long been and remain bent on subjugating Muslims. With arguments unmistakably 
reminiscent of postcolonial luminaries from Fanon to Said, Islamists contend that the West has 
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long harbored and often realized (neo)imperialist designs on the Orient. From the Crusades 
through the colonialism of the “White Man’s Burden” to the current “War on Terror,” this urge 
to dominate Muslims has figured prominent in the Western psyche. Needless to say, the USA 
and Israel lead the “Crusaders and Zionists” of today, but Europe vitriolic recrimination for 
supporting this ongoing injustice and subjugation.87 For example, in his “martyrdom video,” 7/7 
suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan justified his actions with the following insinuation: 
“Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people 
all over the world.”88  
Within Europe, Europeans perpetuate the imperialist tradition and mindset through a 
combined demonization and domination of Muslims that marginalize and exploit them as 
second-class citizens. Britain’s Islamchannel, for instance, advertises itself as the “Voice of the 
Voiceless, Voice of the Oppressed.” Siddiqui charges that “post-Christian secular society,” 
including “the British Government,” seeks “to destroy our values,” while Abdul Wahid, 
Chairman of the British Hizb ut-Tahrir, claims “the government’s long-term objective is to 
manufacture a compliant, subdued, secular Muslim community in Britain.”89 Such remarks are 
unmistakably informed by the postcolonial interpretation of immigration in Europe that discerns 
an ongoing attitude of “coloniality,” that is, “a logic of governmentality that not only supports 
specific forms of historical colonialism but continues to structure a planetary hierarchy in terms 
of a distinction between West and the non-West…beyond the formal institutionalization of 
colonialism.”90 
By stressing Islamists’ fragilization toward postmodern and postcolonial analysis, I do 
not mean to dismiss their capacity for independent thought. I aim rather to proffer an 
interpretation of so-called “multiculturalism” that reads it as an outgrowth of mutual fragilization 
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as opposed to creeping Islamization. Policies of official or “de facto multiculturalism”91 have 
doubtless opened up spaces across Europe where Islamists preach and practice their anti-Western 
and anti-secular worldview. Scores of studies document the existence of transnational enclaves 
in which migrants live by norms and values significantly different from the majority 
population.92 These are not exclusively Islamist enclaves, but Islamists do figure prominently in 
many of them where they carve out what some have called “protection zones”93 or domains of 
“Islamic ambiance.”94 
However, two caveats need to be interjected immediately. First, such Islamist zones of de 
facto autonomy represent tiny islands in a surrounding sea of both irreligious and Christian 
favoritism of the kinds discussed above. Second, and more importantly, Islamist “apartism”95 
does not reflect anything remotely resembling the Islamization of the policy-making process 
itself. European governments continue to be staffed by precious few elected or appointed 
Muslims with influence to shape policy and even fewer seeking to legitimize multicultural 
measures with reference to theocratic passages in the Quran or Hadith. Rather, through 
fragilizing exposure to widely circulated postmodern and postcolonial ideas, many officials have 
come to doubt the morality or the feasibility of insisting that Muslims assimilate to European 
secular norms and values. I am not suggesting that postmodernists and postcolonialists have 
usurped positions of power, though this presumably has occurred in some places. Far likelier is 
that officials who themselves generally prefer what we are calling liberal secular values consider 
plausible the postmodern nihilist notion that those same values are historically and culturally 
contingent rather than universal and, particularly in relation to Muslims, imposed rather than 
desired.96 Resulting solicitude generates sympathy, conscious or unconscious, for the core 
multicultural tenet that migrants should not have to relinquish their particular culture as a 
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condition of migrating to European lands. In my reading, then, multiculturalism does indeed 
represent a certain softening toward Islamism, but not toward those elements that stem directly 
from Islamic doctrine per se, but rather toward those elements which Islamists, being insightful 
observers of current political discourse, have shrewdly if not disingenuously adopted from 
postmodern discourse precisely because they do cast doubt on liberal secular assimilationism. 
We can broadly distinguish between two types of multiculturalist policies: direct and 
indirect support of Islamist organizations. Since the 1970s, European governments at various 
levels have regularly funded a variety of immigrant organizations dedicated to nurturing and 
preserving immigrants’ language and culture in the receiving country. Thus have public monies 
flowed to countless Islamic organizations to erect mosques, establish community centers, found 
female support groups, fund private or public Islamic education, provide imams to undertake 
pastoral work with prisoners or patients, operate public access radio or TV stations, or open 
sports clubs.97 Typically such multiculturalist funding has been provided with minimal strings 
attached. Often officials identify a small number of prominent community leaders to decide how 
to distribute and spend public funds. These “elders” of sorts may pay lip service to liberal 
democratic values but in reality are left to run their organizations with virtually no governmental 
oversight.98 It is important to note that such support for multicultural measures has persisted and 
expanded over the past three decades not merely in countries with an official multicultural policy 
such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium or Britain, but in practically every European land. 
Sometimes, multicultural policies were rationalized to the public under the rubric of 
“reintegration,” that is, preparing the migrants to return to their homelands when, in fact, 
officials knew few planned to so.99 More often, officials tasked with dealing with immigrants 
implemented multicultural measures underneath the political and media radar.100  The 
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Multiculuralism Policy Index at Queens University finds that despite much recent political 
rhetoric denouncing multiculturalism as “failed,” multiculturalist policies in fact increased not 
only from 1980 to 2000, but also from 2000 to 2010 across Europe and “more than offset” the 
high-profile rescinding of such policies in places like the Netherlands since 9/11.101 Moreover, 
much research shows that Islamists, employing their legendary social organizing skills, have 
proven adept at penetrating immigrant organizations and steering them to support an Islamist 
agenda. They spew Europhobic rhetoric, discourage or forbid their members to interact with 
“Europeans,” preach the superiority of Islamic to secular law, and instruct adherents to follow 
the former even if it means transgressing the latter. There is, of course, much Islamophobic fear-
mongering and sensationalism in reporting that exposes such organizations, but it would 
nevertheless be naïve to think that state funding is not reaching Islamists.102 
Second, indirect support for Islamism in Europe occurs through toleration of Islamist 
organizations and mosques which have no relationship with government. All European 
constitutions guarantee religious freedom. As a result, Islamist organizations find much more 
congenial grounds for organizing than they do in most sending countries whose governments 
often repress them (especially before the Arab Spring) – a reason why so many Islamist exiles 
from Ruhollah Khomeini to Necmettin Erbakan to Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni took or take safe 
haven in Europe and organize their efforts from there. They are by and large left free to organize 
as they wish and to raise money from all manner of sources such as the Muslim World League 
bankrolled by Saudi Arabia.103 As mentioned in the introduction, modern European secularism 
implicitly demands that religious organizations eschew theocracy as a condition for exercising 
religious freedom. However, many Islamist groups quite openly espouse theocracy.104 To be 
sure, many of their strivings are directed toward establishing Islamic regimes in the sending 
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countries. However, their efforts can and do apply to European soil. Naturally, there are lunatic 
voices like Omar Bakri, who prophesizes imminent victory in Europe when “the black flag of 
Islam flies over Downing Street.”105 But the lion’s share of Islamist organizations works less 
flamboyantly but nevertheless assiduously to increase step by step and person by person the 
number of believers who value Islamic over secular law. They aspire, often successfully, to carve 
out “zones of exclusion.”106 Within these areas of “self-imposed apartheid” ranging in size from 
the four walls of a flat or mosque to entire neighborhoods, “Islamic” law prevails, including 
when it transgresses secular law (for instance, polygamy or coerced confinement). Here those 
who violate Sharia rather than state law are the ones punished or harassed.107 
Islamist organizations tend to spurn cooperation with Western governments. Indeed, they 
warn their adherents against “Westoxification” (Gharbzadegi), Iranian Jalal al-e Ahmad’s widely 
influential notion that any contact with Westerners is Kufr (impious) and as such can initiate a 
contagion that leads the pious Muslim into sin and, worse, into apostasy. Islamist organizations 
often thwart the efforts of European governments to reach out to Muslims. In Germany, Spain, 
Britain, and France, Islamist associations have refused or withdrawn support for the high-profile 
national councils alluded to above.108 Within European Muslim communities, where Islamist 
organizations are often well organized and well respected, such disapprobation tends to 
undermine the legitimacy of governmental efforts. Programs sponsored by European 
governments are viewed with suspicion as potentially repressive and more often than not simply 
avoided or ignored. The proportion of Islamic organizations that eschew contact with European 
governments is estimated at between one-fourth and one-third.109 As Roy perspicaciously 
observes, so long as “Muslim identity is tinged with a strongly anti-imperialist hue,” enthusiastic 
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support from a European government can often “amount to giving them [the sponsored Muslim 
organizations] the kiss of death.”110  
I do not highlight Islamism with the intention of fueling the flames of Islamophobic 
hysteria. I aim instead to underscore the complex, polyvalent nature of European secularism. In 
theory, European secular states are supposed to be neutral toward religion. In reality, despite 
important institutional differences,111 they all at once preach the supremacy of secular law that 
treats all believers and non-believers equally, oversee extensive Christian (and sometimes 
Jewish) favoritism, endeavor to combat discrimination against Muslims, reach out to Euro-
Muslims, and support or tolerate Islamists who thwart efforts to strengthen Euro-Islam. In this 
vein, it is interesting to note Bader’s observation in his major study of European secularism: 
States are not monolithic. Aims and strategies vary, and the legislative, judicial 
and executive branches often follow contradictory policies. The differentiation 
only increases when comparing federal, state and local levels. Every state thus 
shows a variety of partly inconsistent institutional arrangements; and actual 
policies diverge from legal norms.112 
  
In reality, most European governments do not practice secularism, rather secularisms – a 
complex, dynamic intermingling and over-layering of policies whose intent and consequences 
often run deeply at odds with one another.113 Such policy messiness reflects widening mutual 
fragilization whereby policymakers and citizens alike become increasingly accustomed to, if not 
necessarily comfortable with, the co-existence of rival outlooks and approaches to religion in 
contemporary life and society. As mutual fragilization expands both the prospect of and perhaps 
need for an “overlapping consensus,” let alone coherent policy, dwindle. 
POST-ISLAMISM 
Make no mistake. Mutual fragilization can prompt mutual demonization but it need not, as the 
example of post-Islamism attests. As conscious or unconscious apprehension regarding the 
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persuasiveness of one’s preferred outlooks intensifies, the temptation to demonize one’s 
perceived adversaries can strengthen. If the arguments for one’s position seem less able to 
persuade adversaries on the basis of merit alone, then assailing one’s opponents can present itself 
as an increasingly tempting strategy. Demonization can prove highly alluring, for it distracts 
attention away from one’s own vulnerabilities, exaggerates the foes’ shortcomings, and often 
garners considerable attention. As political actors follow the lead of media producers who know 
that bad news sells better than good news, the politics of immigration in Europe has increasingly 
degenerated into a politics of slighting, fear-mongering and scapegoating.114 Indeed, the hate 
promoters tend not only to prey but also depend on one another. Thus Islamophobes’ outlandish 
distortions of Islam and Muslims become the Europhobes’ evidence that the entire West is evil 
and sadistic, and vice versa. The opposing camps become locked in a self-referencing and self-
reinforcing war of manipulated words and images that becomes virtually hermetically sealed off 
from other more nuanced discussion and analysis.115 
 Rather than flee fragilization into essentialist and binary stereotypes, post-Islamists 
embrace the ambivalence of fragilization as an opportunity to discover new insights. The latter 
unpredictably emerge through the hybrid combination of worldviews presumed to be mutually 
exclusive: liberalism and Islamism. I apply the less-than-perfect label “post-Islamists”116 to refer 
to a new generation of Muslim intellectuals and activists in search of a “more sophisticated 
idiom of Islam.”117 While their critique of many aspects of modern Western societies is 
unmistakably informed by the thought of earlier Islamists such as Qutb or Abul Ala Maududi, 
these “moderate Muslims”118 eschew the wholesale rejection of Western society associated with 
both the Islamist pioneers as well as their contemporary orthodox adherents. “I don't deny my 
Muslim roots,” claims Tariq Ramadan, “but I don't vilify Europe either."119 The proponents of 
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this “critical Islam”120 tend to reside in Europe, to stem from the middle class, and to be highly 
and mostly Western educated.121 They tend to adopt and become comfortable with many of the 
styles and rhythms of modern Western life regarding, for instance, education, professionalism, 
consumerism and individualism.122 That said, they operate in a fully “transnational religious 
discourse”123 that is profoundly in touch with and deeply colored by prominent reformist thinkers 
in the Middle East such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Rachid al-Ghannouchi 
and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. These mavericks in Europe are contesting for leadership, often with 
success, with an older more strictly anti-Western guard in Islamist associations such as the Union 
of Islamic Organisations in Europe (OIOE), Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG) or the 
UK Islamic Mission. They publish their ideas in journals and magazines such as Q-News, The 
Muslim News, La Medina and Die Islamische Zeitung or on websites such as Islam21.net, 
oumma.com and huda.de. 124 
In contrast to Euro-Muslims, post-Islamists resist a wholesale endorsement of the modern 
West. To be sure, post-Islamists recognize and value certain aspects of Western society. Chief 
among these are democratic rights and liberties, particularly religious freedom. Thus does 
Ramadan remind readers that it is precisely the separation of church and state that can “protect 
the total independence of Muslims in France.”125 The erstwhile leader of IGMG, Mehmet 
Erbakan, contends that European Muslims live in far superior conditions for freely exercising 
their religion than ninety percent of their Muslim brethren in the so-called “Islamic world,” 
where authoritarian regimes have traditionally quashed religious freedom. Such authoritarian 
rule, even when done in the name of Islamic law, he maintains “is not a fulfillment of God’s will 
rather its perversion.”126 Tunisian exile (until 2011) al-Ghannouchi famously changed Europe’s 
designation from the conventional dar-al-harb (space hostile to Muslims) to dar-al-Islam (space 
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congenial to Islam).127 Ramadan endorsed the Tunisian’s re-categorization but augmented it to 
dar al-shahada (space of testimony).128  The Swiss activist and grandson of Muslim Brotherhood 
Founder Hassan al-Banna implores European Muslims to take advantage of the great 
opportunities and rights available there -- to abandon their “Pakistani, Turkish or Arab” 
“ghettos” (both “social and intellectual”) and “integrate themselves into European culture”129 – 
and thereby craft a “more self-critical” Islam130 as well as a model of “Islamic citizenship” that 
will stand as an example (testimony) to the rest of the Islamic world to emulate in the 21st 
century.131 
Post-Islamists simply do not discern the incompatibility between Islam and “Western” 
values postulated by Islamophobes and Islamists alike. The Union of Islamic Organizations of 
France (UOIF), the IGMG and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), despite their Islamist 
links, each publicly proclaims its fidelity to the constitution of France, Germany and Britain 
respectively.132 MCB, for example, officially “encourag[es] individual Muslims and Muslim 
organisations to play a full and participatory role in public life.”133 Granted, European 
constitutions permit some things, such as usury and alcohol consumption, that Islam forbids. 
However, the critical point is that none of the constitutions obliges Muslims to engage in such 
activities.134 Hassan Safoui, the media manager of UOIF, sees, for instance, no reason why 
persons of different “beliefs or references” cannot “agree on shared values” that build a “mutual 
ethics between Islam and the West to fight social diseases in the European communities.”135 
As intimated in the previous quotation, post-Islamists discern grave shortcomings in 
European societies. Moreover, they believe themselves to be particularly well situated both to 
recognize and remedy such profound problems. This more critical predisposition distinguishes 
them from Euro-Muslims, who, generally speaking, interpret the achievements of Western 
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society since the European Enlightenment as progressive and exemplary. In the eyes of post-
Islamists, Muslims, as victims of European imperialism, are well suited to expose the darker side 
of European “greatness.” They possess firsthand experience with the injustice and inequality that 
go hand in hand with European prosperity and power not only in the Third World, whence most 
European Muslims hail, but also in Europe itself, where they are exploited and discriminated 
against.136 Muslims can also help to correct the lopsided interpretation proffered by 
Eurocentrism, which views Western Civilization as the lone font of the world’s greatest and 
lasting achievements. Ramadan chastises this supercilious combination of ignorance and 
arrogance with which Eurocentric secularists dismiss all but their own ideas:  
Convinced that they are progressive, they give themselves the arbitrary right to 
proclaim the definitively reactionary nature of religions…In the end, only a 
handful of “Muslims-who-think-like-us” are accepted, while the others are denied 
the possibility of being genuinely progressive fighters armed with their own set of 
values. By doing this, the dialogue with Islam is transformed into an interactive 
monologue which massages “our ideological certainties” just as Huntington 
wanted to ensure “our strategic interests.”137 
 
Proud, educated, outspoken Muslims can shed light on not only the great accomplishments of 
Islamic civilization, but the latters’ profound contribution to so-called “Western civilization” 
itself.138 A genuinely open dialogue that includes Muslims and Islam as part of Europe past and 
present -- that undermines rather than perpetuates binary stereotypes -- can lead to a fuller if 
admittedly less self-congratulatory comprehension of Europeanness.139 
Post-Islamists want, however, more than merely to be considered insiders rather than 
outsiders to Europe. They want to improve Europe; and they want to do so qua Muslims. They 
refuse to relegate their religion to the private sphere (like, say, a hobby) as the cost of fully 
participating in public life. Thus did the founding members of the Union des Jeunes Musulmans 
announce in 1987 their goal to “live our spirituality in the open and not in a reclusive way in the 
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private sphere.”140 IGMG maintains that “Islam is a social and individual way of living, the 
influence of which certainly does not end at a mosque’s doorstep.”141 Likewise, MCB strives for 
“a multi-faith, pluralist society with a conscious policy of recognizing that people’s cultural and 
faith identities are not merely a private matter but have public implications.”142 Each 
organization echoes the words of the influential leader of the London-based European Council 
for Fatwa and Research, al-Qaradawi, who asserts: “No Muslim who believes that Islam is the 
word of God can conceive that this great religion will ever accept being a mere appendix to 
socialism or any other ideology.”143 
In contrast to Islamophobes, Islamists, and Euro-Islamists, all of whom view Europe as 
essentially a finished product, post-Islamists see it as a work in progress, indeed, one in need of 
considerable work and progress. For them, Islam represents a wellspring of universal values such 
as the fundamental equality of all humans before God, humility and respect for God’s creation 
(environment), individual responsibility and industry, but also sympathy, aid and justice for the 
downtrodden and unfortunate, that if adapted and applied to modern life can greatly improve 
it.144 The spiritual, and thereby the ethical, dimension of life has been neglected as Europeans 
have become mesmerized by the admittedly impressive physical accomplishments and comforts 
of modernization. “We do not want modernization without soul or values; we want ethical 
reform. We want to transform the world in the name of the justice and human dignity that, sadly, 
are often forgotten in the current inhumane global (dis)order.”145 For Ramadan, national modern 
identity represents a jejune substitute for genuinely religious identity. The former teaches 
humans “how” to exist but not, like Islam, “why” they exist. It leaves them lacking a deeper 
meaning and purpose with which to assess rather than merely accept the latest trends and 
fashions of modern life. It no less than robs humankind of its proper and proportionate 
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relationship to the rest of the universe by anthropomorphically and mistakenly placing man at the 
center of that universe.146 
Post-Islamists do not pretend to have all the answers. They underscore dialogue. UOIF’s 
commitment to open dialogue is typical of other organizations with post-Islamist leanings: 
“Diversity is inherent in human nature. The UOIF believes that dialogue is the best way to 
achieve mutual recognition among members of a common society. The UOIF opposes a 
rupturing discourse based on the hatred and rejection of others…The only acceptable approach to 
dealing with the emergence of problems of misunderstanding is dialogue, explanation and 
education.”147  Post-Islamists do not seek to Islamize Europe, but they do demand a prominent 
place for Islam at the dialogue table and therefore in public life. They do insist on the need to 
formulate through dialogue what Ramadan calls a “new ‘We.’”148 This is a new understanding of 
what it means to be European that includes rather than excludes Islam, that views “Muslims – 
with their spirituality, ethics and creativity” -- as a “contribution” rather than a threat. This will 
demand recognition that  
European societies have been changing, and the presence of Muslims has forced 
them to experience an even greater diversity of cultures. As a result, a European 
identity has evolved that is open, plural and constantly in motion, thanks to the 
cross-fertilisation between reclaimed cultures of origin and the European cultures 
that now include new (Muslim) citizens.149 
 
CONCLUSION 
Social scientists tend to prefer order to messiness. They are wont to design models and 
typologies that endeavor to make sense of a complicated reality. In the comparative study of both 
immigration and secularism the prevailing paradigm underscores national models and path 
dependency. As noted above, the French are said to follow a republican model of immigrant 
incorporation, the British a multicultural model, the Germans an ethno-national model.150 As far 
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as secularism is concerned, France practices strict separation, Britain weak establishment, 
Germany institutionalized neutrality.151 
 Despite admitted advantages, such modeling with the nation-state as the central unit of 
analysis has at least two drawbacks.152 By accentuating differences, it glosses over similarities 
across nation-states. As demonstrated above, most governments of Europe oversee multiple 
forms of secularism at once. Bias in favor of Christianity and against Islam exists everywhere, 
attempts to encourage Euro-Islam can be found in most lands, and both Islamism and post-
Islamism are Europe-wide phenomena. The nation-state models paradigm also exaggerates the 
extent of normative consensus within each nation-state. Yet, above we encountered vehement 
debate in each land regarding how best to incorporate Islam and Muslims -- debate, moreover, 
that tends to take on similar expressions from one country to the next. Islamophobes are no more 
confined to, say, France than Islamists are to the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, this pan-European discourse over the proper form secularism should take 
has a fragilizing effect. The diversity of avidly but plausibly defended stances weakens 
conviction and confidence. The resulting solicitude regarding one’s preferred stance occasions 
philosophically inconsistent but politically pragmatic combinations of vying points of views. 
Official sponsors of Euro-Islam nevertheless adopt an Islamophobic suspicion of Muslims. The-
West-hating Islamists employ tropes stemming from postmodern analysis rooted in Nietzschean 
nihilism. Post-Islamists combine approval with criticism of modern European life. Fragilization 
facilitates policy messiness as the prospect of and perhaps need for an overarching consensus 
fade. Once considered largely settled, secularism in Europe today represents a complex, 
contested, protean, social and political phenomenon that through ongoing transformation is 
profoundly altering the way Europeans view and experience religion in the 21st century. 
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